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Abstract
We model an environment, where bidders’ private values may change over time as a result
of both costly private actions and exogenous shocks. Examples of private actions include in-
vestment and entry decisions; shocks might be due to exogenous changes in a potential buyer’s
circumstances. We describe an eﬃcient auction mechanism that maximizes the ﬁnal value of the
object to the winning bidder net of the total cost of investment by all agents. In particular, we
show that, assuming that the auctioneer does not have full commitment power, costly signalling
is necessary for eﬃcient entry when agents receive private information both before and after
they make the entry decision. To rule out pooling equilibria that coexist with the eﬃcient equi-
librium in the basic mechanism, we introduce a virtual-implementation-style mechanism that
( i )i sa l m o s te ﬃcient; (ii) forces players to coordinate on the separating equilibrium; and (iii) is
simple enough to be potentially useful in practice.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
If an object is available for use at some future date, what is an eﬃcient mechanism for selling it?
Consider a sale of a hypothetical military base that is scheduled to close in ten years. Waiting
with the sale for ten years and auctioning oﬀ the base immediately before it becomes available
creates an ineﬃciency as the winning bidder might have missed opportunities to invest in assets
complementary to the base ownership. In other words, private actions that a bidder chooses prior
to the actual sale may inﬂuence her private value. If a bidder thinks that her likelihood of winning
the object is suﬃciently low, she would choose not to make a costly investment that increases
her valuation of the object. On the other extreme, selling the base ten years before it becomes
available seems absurd, because the expected value of the object for each bidder is likely to change
over time. In other words, as long as there are privately observed exogenous shocks to private
values that are revealed over time, auctioning oﬀ the object well in advance (before the exogenous
shocks are observed) may be ineﬃcient.
Changes in private values due to private actions and exogenous shocks are ubiquitous.1 A
sale of almost any object or service available for use at some known future date is an example of
such situation, ranging from leasing a building under construction to renting a dance club for New
Year’s Eve. A sale of an object in a market where search is important inevitably has elements of
this environment. Consider the sale of a house that is scheduled to be auctioned oﬀ in two weeks.
Before the house becomes available, bidders may have opportunities to buy other houses, essentially
removing themselves from the market. Thus, we can consider an action consisting of “not buying
some other reasonably priced house” as an action that boosts the value of the house. A standard
auction (or any other single-round auction mechanism) is bound to be ineﬃcient in a market with
search because in this environment information revelation is necessary for achieving eﬃciency. Our
model seeks to oﬀer insights into auction design for such markets.
Auctions with entry costs are related to the environment we study. Mathematically, decision
to pay for costly entry into an auction is a particular case of an action that boosts the private
value of the agent (see Example 3). Entry costs are investigated in various contexts by Milgrom
(1981, 2004), Samuelson (1985), McAfee and McMillan (1987), McAfee, Quan, and Vincent (1992),
Riordan and Sappington (1987), Levin and Smith (1994), Fullerton and McAfee (1999), and Lixin
1Recent studies of similar environments include Bergemann and Valimaki (2000, 2002), Calzolari and Pavan
(2002), Eso and Szentes (2003) and Cremer, Spiegel, and Zheng (2003). Myerson (1986) employs the mechanism
design perspective to explore an environment, where only exogenous changes to agents’ valuations are possible.
Other studies that focus on exogenous shocks to valuations are Haile (2000, 2001, 2003). Haile (2001) allows for the
possibility of resale. McAfee, Takacs, and Vincent (1999) use a similar model.
2Ye (2000, 2004). Both in McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Levin and Smith (1994), entry decision
are made by symmetric agents that have no speciﬁc information on the value of object to them;
therefore, the crucial role is played by the equilibrium number of entering agents. In contrast,
Samuelson (1985) studies an entry model where agents learn no new information upon entry; still,
agents entry strategies are conditional on other agents’ entry decision. Our model, where agents
receive information both before and after they act (e.g., enter or make a complimentary investment)
allows to extend the eﬃcient-entry results and, at the same time, to highlight the fact that eﬃcient
entry in a general setup necessitates the use of costly signalling.
We propose a formal model with three periods. In the ﬁrst period, each party receives a private
signal s about its private value for the object. In the second period, a party can take a private,
unobservable action (investment) at cost c that increases the value of the object by b.I nt h et h i r d
period, bidders receive independent exogenous shocks t to their private values of the object. For
ith bidder, the ﬁnal reservation price for the object is a function of signals (si and ti) regarding the
value obtained in the ﬁrst and third periods plus the beneﬁt b from taking an action if the bidder
took the action (V (si,t i)+b) (c is sunk). Otherwise, the private value of the object is V (si,t i).
The identity of the bidder with the highest value can only be established after the third period
signals ti are observed. Thus, an eﬃcient allocation mechanism requires that the ownership of the
object is assigned after the third period. Conducting a second price auction after the third period
is not eﬃcient (in a world where ﬁrst period signals are privately observed), since it forces agents to
take decisions regarding second period actions in ignorance of the expected private values of other
agents. The following example illustrates this simple but essential point.
Example 1 Let the number of participants be N =2 , assume that si are privately observed signals
independently drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,1] and V (s)=s (eﬀectively there is no
third period signal). Since there is no third-period uncertainty the social planner chooses exactly one
agent to make a costly investment — the one with the highest ﬁrst-period signal.2 In a symmetric
equilibrium with no revelation of the ﬁrst-period signals, each agent invests if her probability of
winning conditional on her own type is higher than c
b. That is, agent i invests if si ≥ s∗ = c
b. If
s∗ = 3
4,t h e nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y 1
16 both agents invest (which is ineﬃcient), and with probability 9
16
no agent invests (which is ineﬃcient as well). Therefore, on average there are too few actions (1
2
instead of 1). If s∗ = 1
4, the situation is reversed: with probability 9
16 both agents invest, and with
2In the special case of all ti’s equal to zero, an eﬃcient allocation rule can be implemented by assigning the
ownership of the object by conducting a Vickrey auction at the end of the ﬁrst period after si’s are privately learned.
For any non-degenerate distribution of third-period signals, assigning the ownership of the object at the end of the
ﬁr s tp e r i o di sn ol o n g e re ﬃcient. Of course, the ineﬃciency of allocating the object at the end of the third period
demonstrated by the example does not go away when ti’s are not equal to zero.
3probability 1
16 no agent invests. On average, there are too many actions (3
2 instead of 1). This
is hardly surprising: without signalling, there are too few investment, when actions are relatively
costly ( c
b = 3
4), and there are too many investment, when actions are relatively cheap (c
b = 1
4).
We consider a problem of designing an eﬃcient mechanism for allocating the object in the
environment, where signals about bidder’s private values (si,a n dti) are private. Without assuming
the full commitment power on behalf of the social planner, a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
cannot be straightforwardly employed since bidders do not know their ﬁnal valuations which are
evolving over time and bidders can take value-enhancing actions. In our analysis, we do not
assume that the auctioneer has full commitment power. If such commitment is assumed, then the
dynamic modiﬁcation of the VCG mechanism suggested by Bergemann and Valimaki (2001) assures
a socially optimal allocation.3 Either with or without full commitment, given two-stage nature of
information, eﬃciency requires at least two rounds of announcements of types: the announcements
cannot be made at the same time, since an eﬃcient investment decision necessarily depends on the
realization of the preliminary signals.
First, for our environment, we deﬁne an outcome as the identity of the bidder who receives the
object and the list of private investments taken by bidders. For a given outcome, the social surplus
is equal to the value of the object to the agent who receives it net of the total cost of investment.
We start with considering a social planner that pursues a strategy maximizing the expected social
surplus as an eﬃciency benchmark. Since the exogenous shock of the third period is not known
in the second period, when decisions to take actions are made, it may be eﬃcient to have more
than one bidder making an investment or to have no bidders investing at all. Part (i) of Theorem
1 establishes that if the social planner orders an agent with the ﬁrst-period value si to invest, then
she also orders all agents with value greater than si to invest.
Of course, an all-knowing and well-intentioned social planner is rarely available in the real world.
What happens if there is no social planner but all the information is common knowledge, i.e. signals
obtained by a bidder about her private value are observed by all players? Part (ii) of Theorem 1
establishes that the eﬃcient allocation can be achieved in a decentralized case, extending results of
McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Levin and Smith (1994) to the situation where potential entrants
are heterogenous and absorb information both before and after they make the entry decision.
The above results rely on bidders’ private values being common knowledge. A more realistic
3The proof is spelled out in the working paper version (Bergemann and Valimaki, 2000, pages 15-17), but not in
the ﬁnal publication (Bergemann and Valimaki, 2002). It is also worth pointing out that the adaptation of the VCG
for the dynamic environment proposed in Bergemann and Valimaki, 2000 yields large negative revenues for the seller
in some states of the world, the mechanism proposed in this paper insures that the seller’s revenues are positive.
4case, where bidders privately observe their valuations, is of primary interest. Can an eﬃcient
allocation be achieved in that case? It is straightforward that an eﬃcient allocation can not be
attained without revelation of bidders’ private signals (si) prior to the second period. If the object
is allocated to the bidder with the highest value following the third period (using, say, a second
price sealed bid auction) adding a cheap talk stage following the ﬁrst period will not result in any
information revelation and thus would lead to an ineﬃcient outcome.4 Indeed, each bidder would
claim to be of the ‘high type’ because the higher is the perceived type of a bidder, the less likely
are the other bidders to make investments and thus the lower are their subsequent bids. Theorem 2
and Theorem 3 show that there exists an eﬃcient mechanism, where private information is revealed
in the ﬁrst round and the object is assigned in the second round. The ﬁrst round takes place after
private signals si are received by agents. In the ﬁrst round, bidders reveal their private signals si
by making payments (we show that the higher is the private signal si, the higher is the agent’s
willingness to pay for reporting to other agents that the value of her private signal si is high). The
second round consists of a second-price sealed-bid auction conducted after signals ti are received.
As long as private signals si a r et r u t h f u l l yr e v e a l e di nt h eﬁrst round, the subgame corresponding
to the second round is identical to the complete information game. Theorem 2 establishes that the
mechanism described above has an eﬃcient separating equilibrium. Unfortunately, this mechanism
also has an ineﬃcient pooling equilibrium. To rule out the pooling equilibrium, we propose a
class of mechanisms that force players to coordinate on the separating equilibrium. We refer to
mechanisms from this class as “ε−coupon mechanisms.” We prove that one can always choose an
ε−coupon mechanism which yields an eﬃcient allocation with probability arbitrarily close to one.
An ε−coupon mechanism consists of two rounds. The ﬁrst round takes place after private signals
si are received by agents: a non-transferable discount for amount ε is sold via a sealed-bid all-pay
auction. After the all-pay auction all bids are made public. The ε d i s c o u n tc a no n l yb eu s e di nt h e
second round auction. In the second round the object is sold using a Vickrey auction (if the winner
of the Vickrey auction is a holder of the ε discount, she pays the second highest bid minus ε). For
ε =0 , this mechanism is identical to the eﬃcient mechanism described above. Theorem 4 shows
that an arbitrarily small positive ε forces agents to coordinate on a separating equilibrium that
yields an eﬃcient allocation with probability converging to one as ε converges to zero. In spirit,
this mechanism is very close to virtual implementation (e.g., Maskin and Sjostrom, 2002).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the formal model.
4The condition that the object is allocated to the bidder with the highest value following the third period is
a necessary, but not suﬃcient condition for eﬃcient allocation. This is because eﬃciency depends on the set of
players that invest in the second period. As we mentioned before, the winning bidder might have forgone investment
opportunities enhancing the value of the object.
5S e c t i o n3d e s c r i b e sa ne ﬃcient mechanism that has a fully separating perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium. Section 4 introduces the ε−coupon mechanism and establishes that it has a unique robust
equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Setup
There are N ex-ante identical agents. In the ﬁrst and the third periods, agents receive independent
signals about their private values of the object.5 In the second period, each agent has an opportunity
to make an irreversible costly investment that increases her private value of the object.
Timing
Period 1. Each agent receives a signal si ≥ 0 about her private values, drawn independently from
the same atomless distribution.
Period 2. Each agent i has an opportunity to make a (private) investment ai ∈ {0,1}, which
increases the agent’s private value by bai and costs cai ≥ 0, b>c .W h e nai =1we say that the
agent i invests; if ai =0we say that the agent i abstains from investing.
Period 3. Agents receive independent signals ti ≥ 0 about their private values, drawn from the
same (atomless) distribution. We assume that a higher ﬁrst-period signal si makes a higher third-
period ti (weakly) more likely. Formally, if si >s 0
i, then the distribution of ti conditional on si
stochastically dominates the distribution of ti conditional on s0
i (ti and si being independent is a
particular case).
Agent’s i private value of the object equals Vi = V (si,t i) plus the beneﬁt from investing.
Therefore, the utility of the agent is given by:
Ui =
½
V (si,t i)+( b − c)ai − pi, if the agent i wins the object
−cai − pi, otherwise,
where pi denotes the total amount of payments made by the agent i within a mechanism (i.e. not
including c).6 Note that pi need not be equal to zero for loosing bidders. We assume that V (si,t i)
is continuous and increasing in both arguments.
5We focus on the simplest possible model that allows to explore dynamic aspects of the environment. Extending
the results to the common-value case, e.g. using the Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) constrained-eﬃcient mechanism,
is a topic for future research.
6It is possible to extend our model to the case when the utility function takes the form Ui(si,t i,a i), where ai
is continuous, and higher values of ai makes a higher third-period signal ti more likely. However, it would make
exposition much more complex, while providing no new insight.
6To explore the model, we need to extend the concepts of allocation, eﬃciency, and social surplus
to this environment. An outcome is a vector consisting of the list of agents that invest and the
identity of the agent that receives the object. Social surplus is the value of the object to the agent
that gets the object minus the cost of investment taken by all agents: S(a)=V (sj,t j)+baj −
PN
i=1 cai, where j is the identity of the agent that receives the object, and a =( a1,...,a N) is a
vector of agents’ investment decisions. Outcomes can be ranked in terms of eﬃciency by comparing
corresponding expected values of the social surplus. An outcome is eﬃcient (ﬁrst-best), if it yields
the same expected social surplus as the maximum expected social surplus that can be achieved by
the social planner, which observes all signals received by agents, orders agents to invest or not to
invest in the second period, and, ﬁnally, assigns the object.
Example 2 Our model includes, as a particular case, the situation where the second signal is a
reﬁnement of the ﬁrst one. Indeed, let si,t i be independent estimates of the object’s value, taken
before and after the investment stage, and drawn from the same distribution. Then the agent’s
value function net of investment is V (si,t i)=1
2 (si + ti).
Example 3 This example illustrates that the auction with entry, where bidders get private infor-
mation both before and after they make their entry decisions, is a particular case of our setup.
Indeed, suppose that all signals s,t are distributed on a ﬁnite support, W(si,t i) is a function which
is continuous and increasing in both arguments, and D>0 is such that maxsi,ti W(si,t i) <D .Let
b = D and V (si,t i)=W(si,t i) − D. Agents that decided not to invest at the investment stage are
not competing at the ﬁnal stage, as their value of the object is below zero. Eﬀectively, the cost of
investment, c, becomes the entry cost.
3E ﬃcient Mechanism
We start with considering a benchmark case of the eﬃcient mechanism for allocating the object
that can be achieved by a social planner who knows all the private information available to bidders
and controls their moves. Then we consider a mechanism that allocates the object eﬃciently in the
incomplete information case.
3.1 Complete Information
Suppose that, upon observing the ﬁrst-period signals, a social planner decides which agents should
invest in the second period. Formally, there is a mapping of a vector of the ﬁrst period signals s into
7a vector of the second period actions a = a(s), ai =1if agent i invests, and ai =0otherwise.7 At
the end of the third period the social planner assigns the object, thus mapping a triplet of vectors
(s,a,t) i n t oan u m b e rb e t w e e n1 and N.T h eﬁnal assignment of the object is easily characterized.
The social surplus maximization calls for assigning the object to the agent with the highest ex-post
private value: if the eﬃcient allocation assigns the object to the agent j, then for any i 6= j, we have
V (sj,t j)+baj ≥ V (si,t i)+bai. Thus, assigning the object before agents have learned their ﬁnal
values of the object is likely to be ineﬃcient: giving the object to the agent with the highest ex-post
value is only necessary, but not suﬃcient for eﬃciency. The function a∗(s) describes the second
period actions that maximize the expected social surplus. (Hereinafter mathematical expectation
is taken with respect to the second signal t =( t1,...,t N), unless speciﬁed otherwise.)
max



















It is useful to introduce a function Gi(s,a−i) representing the diﬀerence in the expected social
surplus that results from the agent i investing and not investing (keeping the investment decisions
of other agents unchanged):
Gi(s,a−i)=E[S|s,a−i,a i =1 ]− E[S|s,a−i,a i =0 ] . (1)
Since the social planner maximizes social surplus, the expected surplus in the above formula should
be computed under assumption that after the third period, the social planner allocates the object
to the agent with the highest value. The social planner faces the following trade-oﬀ: each additional
agent’s investment increases the expected private value of the agent who receives the object, but
is associated with the cost of c.
In a world without an all-knowing and well-intentioned social planner, agents have to invest
non-cooperatively. As a step towards an eﬃcient mechanism for the main case, suppose that the
ﬁrst-period signals are common knowledge. We show that an eﬃcient allocation can be achieved
in a decentralized case, when bidders know each other’s ﬁrst-period signals. Part (ii) of Theorem
1 states that in this case, there exists an equilibrium outcome of a second price auction conducted
at the end of the third period that yields an eﬃc i e n ta l l o c a t i o n ,t h es a m ea l l o c a t i o na st h eﬁrst
best obtained by the social planner. The basic intuition is as follows: the expected increase in an
agent’s utility from taking an action is exactly equal to the change in the expected social surplus
due to her action.8 A straightforward proof is relegated to the Appendix.
7Though the social planner may assign mixed strategies to the agents, we show later that, almost surely, the social
planner problem has a unique pure strategy solution. Consequently, we focus on pure strategies of the social planner.
8The logic behind the result is similar to the one that insures eﬃcient entry in McAfee and McMillan (1987)
8Theorem 1 (i) For a given vector of the ﬁrst-period private signals s, there exists a threshold
r∗ = r∗(s) such that the social planner assigns agents with the highest r∗ ﬁrst-period signals to
invest.9
(ii) If ﬁrst-period signals s are public knowledge, there exists an eﬃcient perfect Bayesian equi-
l i b r i u mo ft h eg a m ew i t has e c o n dp r i c es e a l e db i da uction conducted at the end of the third period.
In this equilibrium, agents invest as if they were assigned by the social planner according to the
strategy characterized in (i).
Here and in the rest of the paper the term ‘equilibrium’ is reserved for a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. The eﬃcient equilibrium described in Theorem 1 seems to be a natural focal point.
However, the game has a coordination component: there are other perfect Bayesian equilibria that
are not eﬃcient. For example, if there are only two players, there might be multiple equilibria:
e.g., one with the highest-ranked agent investing and the other abstaining, and another one with
the second-ranked agent acting and the highest-ranked abstaining.
The above results cannot be naturally extended to the case when agents’ signals are not sym-
metric or independent. The most simple example that highlights this point is as follows.
Example 4 Suppose that realizations of ﬁrst-period signals are s1 =0and s2 = ε>0. Let signals
t1,t 2 be distributed identically, but not symmetrically (and not independently): t1,t 2 ∈ {0,µ,2},
where µ<1. Joint probabilities are as follows: Pr(0,0) = Pr(0,2) = Pr(µ,0) = Pr(µ,µ)=
Pr(2,µ)=P r ( 2 ,2) = 1
6 and Pr(0,µ)=P r ( µ,2) = Pr(2,0) = 0. Then max{t1+1,t 2}ºmax{t1,t 2+
1}. Let b, the beneﬁt from investing, be equal to 1. If ε>0 is suﬃciently small, max{t1+1,t 2+ε}º
max{t1,t 2+ε+1} as well, which means that maximization of the expected surplus requires the ﬁrst
agent (who has a lower ﬁrst signal) to invest, and the second agent not to invest (for some c>0).
To complete the example, suppose that signals s1,s 2 are distributed independently and can take
values {0,ε} with equal probability. For the pairs (0,ε) and (ε,0) of realized ﬁrst-period signals,
the distribution of the third-period signals is as described above (with the symmetric change for the
case (ε,0)). For pairs (0,0) and (ε,ε), let signals t1,t 2 ∈ {0,µ,2} be distributed identically and
independently.
and Levin and Smith (1994). However, in these two papers, potential bidders are symmetric and have no private
information prior to entry.
9r
∗ is determined almost uniquely: The event that the expected social surplus is maximized by more than one




∗∗ h a sz e r op r o b a b i l i t y .
93.2 Incomplete Information
Now we are ready to investigate the incomplete information case: the only diﬀerence with the
previous section is that here bidders’ signals regarding their private values (s and t)a r eo b s e r v e d
privately. A mechanism consisting of an auction conducted after the third period no longer leads
to an eﬃcient allocation, since under such mechanism agents take second-period actions without
knowledge of the private signals obtained by other players.10 (Obviously, an eﬃcient allocation rule
cannot always assign the ﬁnal ownership of the object prior the end of the third period.)
We explicitly construct an eﬃcient allocation mechanism, which consists of two rounds: The
private information is revealed by signalling that takes place after the ﬁrst-period-private-signals
are observed; the ownership of the object is assigned in the second round that takes place after
the third-period private signals are observed by bidders. Our mechanism does not require any
commitment on the auctioneer’s part. In contrast, the dynamic VCG mechanism by Bergemann
and Valimaki (2000), though does ensure eﬃcient allocation in this setup, is heavily reliant (as any
VCG mechanism, see, e.g., Milgrom, 2004, p. 37) on the ability of the auctioneer to pay some
bidders huge sums ex-post.
The Signalling Mechanism
1. At the end of the ﬁrst period (after the private signals s have been received by agents), all
agents make simultaneous public announcements b si about their private values si. Also, each agent
voluntarily selects a payment amount, hi = hi(b s) ≥ 0, that depends on the announcements of other
agents, as well as on her own announcement, to make his announcement credible.11
2. The second round takes place at the end of the third period, after agents observe their private
signals ti. The ﬁnal ownership of the object is assigned using a second-price sealed-bid auction.
Theorem 2 below asserts that there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the Signalling
Mechanism that yields an eﬃcient outcome. The logic behind the result is as follows. First, if the
ﬁrst-period signals are revealed truthfully, the remaining subgame is identical to the game where
ﬁrst-period signals s are common knowledge. Thus, in order to establish existence of an eﬃcient
10For the sake of completeness, one can consider the no-signalling case, where an auction is conducted after the
third period and no signaling takes place before the second period. (Note that cheap talk communication following
the ﬁrst stage is not credible because everybody has an incentive to exaggerate his signal.) To describe the symmetric
equilibria of this game, one can show that there exists a unique constant s
∗ such that any agent acts if her ﬁrst-stage
value si is higher or equal to s
∗, and abstains from acting otherwise. In the equilibrium, the expected number of
actions is N (1 − Fs(s
∗)). So, in some cases, there are too few actions, while in others there are too many. (cf.
Example 1.) Also, there are a number of asymmetric equilibria, which cannot lead to an eﬃcient allocation rule.
11These payments can be either money burning or transfers to a third party, or even to the seller.
10allocation mechanism, it suﬃces to show that for some payment schedule hi(b s), truthful reporting
is an equilibrium, when agents anticipate that the equilibrium characterized in Theorem 1 will be
played in the remaining subgame. Agents are willing to pay in order to reveal their ﬁrst period
signals, because this information discourages other agents from taking actions, thus increasing the
probability of winning for agent i and decreasing the expected price that she will pay for the
object in the subsequent second price auction conditional on winning. To make truthful revelation
possible, we need to demonstrate that the higher is the ﬁrst period signal si received by agent i,
the higher is that agent’s relative willingness to pay in order to signal that her value of si is high.
Lemma 1, which is the main technical result in this Section, establishes an appropriate analog
of the increasing-diﬀerences property for the payoﬀs in the subgame. Once this property is estab-
lished, the existence of a payment schedule that is consistent with the incentive compatibility and
individual rationality for all agents becomes a standard exercise.
Lemma 1 Let E[πi(si, ˆ si,s −i)] be bidder i’s expected pay-oﬀ gross of hi(b s), when her true private
signal is si, while other agents believe that the vector of ﬁrst-period private signals is (ˆ si,s −i).F o r
any s−i and any ˆ s0





i, ˆ si,s−i)] ≥ E[πi(si, ˆ s0
i,s−i)] − E[πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)]. (2)
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .First, we claim that for any i, and for any s and ˜ s such that s−i ≤ ˜ s−i and
si =˜ si,a ∗
i(˜ s) ≤ a∗






number (function) x, denote x+ =m a x {x,0}.
Suppose that a∗
j(si,s−i) ≤ a∗
j(si,˜ s−i) for all j 6= i. Then
Xi(si,s−i) − Zi(si,s−i) º Xi(si,e s−i) − Zi(si,e s−i)
by Lemma A (1). To prove that gi(s) ≥ gi(˜ s), recall that
gi(s)=E [Xi(s)+b − Zi(s)]
+ − E [Xi(s) − Zi(s)]
+ ,




It is enough to consider the case of a∗
j(si,s−i) ≤ a∗
j(si,˜ s−i) for all j 6= i. Indeed, if a switch from
1 to 0 occurred with an agent that ends up higher than i as a result of an increase from s−i to ˜ s−i,
then it is deﬁnite that a∗
i(˜ s)=0 , and thus a∗
i(˜ s) ≤ a∗
i(s) for any a∗
i(s). Otherwise (if a change have
occurred with an agent ranked lower than the agent i), a∗
i(s)=1 .
Second, we claim that the function gi increases with si. The ﬁrst claim shows, in particular,
that if si increases, while s−i is constant, the number of agents acting (weakly) decreases. Thus,
11the random variable Xi(si,s−i) − Zi(si,s−i) raises in terms of stochastic dominance, and Lemma
A (3) applies.
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The two claims proved above yield that X0
i º Xi and Yi º Y 0
i . Using Lemma A3 (for each
non-negative constant) completes the proof.¥
In the above Lemma, E[πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)] is the expected pay-oﬀ of agent i in the mechanism
described in Section 3.1, when the ﬁrst period private signals are given by (si,s−i) and player i
plays the best response to the action proﬁle of players −i given by a(r∗(ˆ si,s−i)). (The action proﬁle
a(r∗(ˆ si,s−i)) is characterized in Theorem 1.) Essentially, E[πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)] is the pay-oﬀ received
by agent i in the subgame computed under an assumption that all ﬁrst round announcements are
believed to be truthful, and that agent i reported ˆ si, while her true private value is si.L e m m a1
states that the same change in announcement (from ˆ si to ˆ s0
i) brings more in expected surplus to
the agent with relatively high true signal, s0
i.N o t e t h a t E[πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)] is not the same as the
expected utility of agent i, because it does not include the payments hi made in the ﬁrst round of
the mechanism. The agent’s utility is given by E[πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)] − hi. Thus, truthfully reporting si
is consistent with an equilibrium, if there exists a payment schedule hi(ˆ si,s−i) such that incentive
compatibility and individual rationality constraints are satisﬁed. Namely, for any agent i and all
(si, ˆ si,s−i) the payments should satisfy the following conditions:
E[πi(si,s i,s−i)] − hi(si,s−i) > E[πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)] − hi(ˆ si,s−i) (IC)
E[πi(si,s i,s−i)] − hi(si,s−i) > E[πi(si, ˆ si =0 ,s−i)] (IR)
Finding some hi(ˆ si,s−i) that satisﬁes the above constraints is suﬃcient for proving the claim
of Theorem 2. Still, before proceeding to Theorem 2, we need to introduce one more deﬁnition.
12Consider the eﬃcient allocation rule characterized in Theorem 1. It implies that for any vector of
the ﬁrst period private signals s−i, there exists a sequence 0=¯ si(k∗
i ) ≤ ¯ si(k∗
i − 1) ≤ ... ≤ ¯ si(1) ≤
¯ si(0) < ∞, where ¯ si(k) is deﬁned to be the minimal type of i such that exactly k highest-ranked
agents (diﬀerent from the agent i herself) invest in the subgame equilibrium described in Theorem
1. Let k∗
i = k∗
i(0,s−i) be the number of agents investing, when i has the lowest possible type
(zero). Within each segment described above, an agent’s i report is irrelevant to the other agents’
decisions on whether or not to invest. Let a(m) denote the vector of actions, where the agents with
the highest m ﬁrst-period signals invest, while the other N −m agents not invest. Note that a(m)
is a function of the vector of ﬁrst-period signals s.
Theorem 2 The following payment schedules are consistent with the incentive compatibility and
individual rationality conditions (IC and IR, respectively). For any i,
hi(ˆ si,ˆ s−i)=0 , whenever ¯ si(k∗
i ) ≤ ˆ si ≤ ¯ si(k∗
i − 1), (3)
hi(ˆ si,ˆ s−i)=hi(¯ si(k),ˆ s−i)+E[πi(¯ si(k),a(k))] − E[πi(¯ si(k),a(k +1 ) ) ] ,
whenever ¯ si(k) < ˆ si ≤ ¯ si(k−1),k<k ∗
i . Thus, there exists an eﬃcient perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in the Signalling Mechanism.
Proof. Let si be the true agent’s i ﬁrst-period signal, and consider k such that ¯ si(k) < ˆ si ≤ ¯ si(k−1).
Since ˆ s−i is ﬁxed throughout the argument, we suppress the notation. Truthful reporting brings
the expected utility of
E [πi(si,a(k))] − hi(si)=E [πi(si,a(k))] − hi(¯ si(k)) − E [πi(¯ si(k),a(k))] + E [πi(¯ si(k),a(k +1 ) ) ].
First, we prove that the agent i has no incentives to under-report her ﬁrst-period signal, i.e. to
report ˆ si <s i. Consider incentives the agent i with the ﬁrst-period signal ¯ si(k) faces. For any ε
such that ¯ si(k)−¯ si(k+1)>ε>0, she is indiﬀerent between reporting ¯ si(k) and reporting ¯ si(k)−ε.
Indeed, the payment is the same and the number of acting rivals is the same (k+1). The condition
(2) assures that if the agent with ¯ si(k) is indiﬀerent between reporting ¯ si(k) to reporting ¯ si(k)−ε,
then the agent with si > ¯ si(k) (weakly) prefers reporting ¯ si(k) to reporting ¯ si(k) − ε. Thus, ˆ si
can not be less than ¯ si(k). (To rule out reports below ¯ si(k +1 ) , one can consider incentives the
¯ si(k+1)-agent faces.) It remains to show that ˆ si (weakly) exceeds ¯ si(k). So, we need to prove that
E [πi(si,a(k))]−hi(¯ si(k))−E [πi(¯ si(k),a(k))]+E [πi(¯ si(k),a(k + 1))] ≥ E [πi(si,a(k +1 ) ) ] −hi(¯ si(k)),
or equivalently,
E [πi(si,a(k))] − E [πi(si,a(k + 1))] ≥ E [πi(¯ si(k),a(k))] − E [πi(¯ si(k),a(k + 1))],
13but this is true by (2). Since the agent i having the signal si is indiﬀerent between reporting si
and reporting any signal that is larger than ¯ si(k) and does not exceed si, the proof that the agent
i has no incentives to under-report her signal is complete.
The proof that there is no incentives to over-report the signal is analogous. The si−agent
is indiﬀerent between reporting the true signal and reporting ¯ si(k − 1). Indeed, the mechanism
assumes that the agents with reports si and ¯ si(k − 1) pay the same amount. Now, for any ε such
that ¯ si(k−2)−¯ si(k−1) >ε>0, the agent with ¯ si(k−1) is indiﬀerent between reporting the true
signal and reporting ¯ si(k − 1) + ε. To see this, note that
E [πi(¯ si(k − 1),a(k))] − hi(¯ si(k − 1)) = E [πi(¯ si(k − 1),a(k − 1))] − hi(¯ si(k − 1))
−E [πi(¯ si(k − 1),a(k − 1))] + E [πi(¯ si(k − 1),a(k))].
By (2),
E [πi(¯ si(k − 1),a(k − 1))] − E [πi(¯ si(k − 1),a(k))] ≥ E [πi(si,a(k − 1))] − E [πi(si,a(k))].
Thus, if the ¯ si(k − 1) is indiﬀerent between reporting the truth and reporting ¯ si(k − 1) + ε, the
si-agent (weakly) prefers to report ¯ si(k − 1) (which is pay-oﬀ equivalent to reporting the truth),
than to report ¯ si(k − 1) + ε. To show, that ˆ si would not exceed ¯ si(k − 2), one should consider the
incentives the ¯ si(k−2)-agent faces, etc. Therefore, the agent i has no incentives to over-report her
ﬁrst-period signal.
Now, if agents in the set −i report their type truthfully, ˆ s−i = s−i, the payment scheme for
the agent i given by (3) induces her to report her type truthfully, ˆ si = si. Lemma 1 ensures
that the above payment schedule induces truthful reporting by agent i, provided that all other
agents’ reports are truthful. The beliefs supporting the equilibrium in the signalling stage are
straightforward: if a payment by an agent i is deﬁned by (3), then the agents ﬁrst-period signal
is perceived to lie within the respective range. In the subgame that starts after the ﬁrst-period
signals are revealed, agents play according to the strategies described in Theorem 1.¥
3.3 Ex-ante Eﬃcient Equilibrium
The mechanism described above provides an ex-post eﬃcient ex-post equilibrium (Cremer and
McLean, 1985), where no agent regrets her announcement after learning the other agents’ types.
In such an equilibrium, agents’ payments may depend on the other agents’ announcements. Below
we show that the Signalling Mechanism described in the previous section also has an ex-ante
eﬃcient separating equilibrium. In this equilibrium, agents make no announcements (or make
uninformative announcements) in the cheap talk stage of the mechanism. They simultaneously
14make publicly observable payments Hi; an agent decides on the payment size without knowing the
private signals of other agents. We show that there exists a fully separating equilibrium where
there is a unique payment corresponding to each private signal si. Consequently, agents no longer
need to make announcements, because the announcements of their private signals are revealed in
t h es i z eo fp a y m e n t st h e ym a k e .
Theorem 3 There exists an eﬃcient equilibrium in the Signalling Mechanism, where agents si-
multaneously make payments Hi(si) that depend only on their private information si. Equilibrium
payments are given by Hi(ˆ si)=Es−i[hi(ˆ si,s−i)], where hi(ˆ si,s−i) are equilibrium payments deﬁned
in Theorem 2.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 .A c c o r d i n gt oT h e o r e m1 ,a ne ﬃcient allocation can be obtained, when the
ﬁrst period signals si are common knowledge. It remains to show that the signalling mechanism
proposed above is incentive compatible when an eﬃcient equilibrium is chosen in the subgame
following the signalling stage. It suﬃces to observe that
si ∈ argmax
ˆ si
{E[πi(ˆ si,s−i)] − hi(ˆ si,s−i)}
for any s−i and any si, and take sum over all s−i.
Then note that all hi(ˆ si,s−i) and thus the function Hi(si) increases in the bidder’s i ﬁrst-period
signal si. This allows to use Hi(si) to report the true value of si. Beliefs are straightforward.¥
Although existence of an ex-ante equilibrium follows directly from existence of an ex-post equi-
librium, it is a useful result. It shades some light on the maneuvering that bidders often make prior
to an auction: for example, ﬁrms preparing to participate in a large-scale privatization auction or
competing for a procurement contract might engage in costly signalling in order to discourage po-
tential rivals. For example, consider the story of selling the Los Angeles license in 1995 broadband
auction for mobile-phone licenses. One bidder, Paciﬁc Telephone, possibly started with a higher
private value than other bidders due to experience in California market and possible synergies be-
tween its wireline and wireless businesses. There was a number of important decisions (actions)
that each bidder had to make before the auction for Los Angeles license, these included forming
alliances, making investments and formulating strategies for other markets. It appears that Paciﬁc
Telephone signaled to other bidders (and would-be bidders) that it anticipates winning California.
Paciﬁc Telephone made public statements like ‘If somebody takes California away from us, they’ll
never make any money’.12 To make these statement credible, Paciﬁc Telephone made investments
12Wall Street Journal, October 31, 1994.
15that were of little value without winning Los Angeles license13. As a result, some potential bidders
(including the industry giants such as Bell Atlantic, GTE, and MCI) were discouraged from partic-
ipating in the auction. (Thus failing to undertake an action, in our interpretation). In fact, GTE
and Bell Atlantic took actions that made them ineligible for the auction. As a result, revenues
were quite low compared to initial estimates.14 Applying the logic of our model highlights the
importance of signalling that discourages competitors from taking actions that increase the value
of the prize for them.
4A R o b u s t A u c t i o n
The eﬃcient mechanism described in the previous section can be viewed as a two-stage auction.
The reporting stage, where agents simultaneously make payments that reveal their types, might
be replaced with a sealed-bid all-pay auction, where the object being sold is worth nothing (zero).
Theorem 3 established existence of an eﬃcient perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this two-stage auc-
tion. Unfortunately, this is not a unique equilibrium: a pooling equilibrium, where everybody bids
zero in the signalling stage, is a natural focal point. Nevertheless, introducing a possibility of a
small ineﬃciency into the auction design can force bidders to coordinate on an eﬃcient separating
equilibrium. Also, this new mechanism allows seller to capture the signalling costs of bidders. The
sacriﬁce that must be made in order to gain robustness and capture signalling costs is an arbitrarily
small loss in eﬃciency. We will refer to such a mechanism as an ε−coupon mechanism.W es t a r t
with describing an ε−coupon mechanism and then proceed to establish eﬃciency properties of this
mechanism in Theorem 4.
13Some of the investments made by Paciﬁc Telephone might be interpreted as actions and others as signals.
Essentially, running a PR campaign aimed at signaling that Paciﬁc Telephone is determined to win Los Angeles
license can be interpreted as signaling. In contrast, making unobservable arrangements made to expedite creation of
the wireless service in Southern California can be interpreted as an action.
14This is not the only possible interpretation of the 1995 auction for Los Angeles licence. Klemperer (2000) considers
the history of this auction and suggests that the winner’s curse played an important role because the winner’s curse
is particularly powerful in auctions where one bidder has an advantage. For a theoretical argument that uses this
logic, see also Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999). The outcome of that auction was probably determined by a
constellation of a large number of factors. Revenue in the auction for Los Angeles licence were low in comparison
with spectrum auction in Chicago; however, it is not clear if asymmetry among bidders and the winner curse were
more severe in California.
16The ε−Coupon Mechanism
1. The ﬁrst (reporting) round takes place at the end of the ﬁrst period (after the private signals s
have been received by agents, but before agents take actions). In this round one, coupon is sold via
all pay sealed bid auction.15 All bids are announced at the end of the round. The coupon sold in
the signalling round entitles its owner to a discount of size ε for the price in the ﬁnal auction. The
discount coupon is not-transferable: only the winner of the ﬁnal auction can beneﬁtf r o mh a v i n g
the coupon.
2. The second round (ﬁnal) auction takes place at the end of the third period, after agents observe
private signals t. In the second round the ownership of the object is assigned using a second price
sealed bid auction. If the highest bidder in the ﬁnal round is the owner of the ε−coupon, then she
pays the second highest bid minus ε.
Formally, there are two rounds and three decision nodes in an ε−coupon mechanism. At the
ﬁrst decision node, agents make bids in an all-pay auction, i.e. the i’s actions space is {Hi|Hi ≥ 0}.
The information set of agent i at the ﬁrst decision node is given by si. The ﬁrst round strategy is
described by the probability distribution ρi(·;si) over the set of pure strategies {Hi|Hi ≥ 0}.A t
the second decision node, agents make a decision to invest or not to invest. The information set
of agent i at the second decision node is given by (si,H i,H−i,w),w h e r ew is an N-dimensional
vector with wk =1if the agent k won the coupon in the all pay auction, and wk =0otherwise.
(There is a unique vector w consistent with vector of payments H, unless there is a tie). The
probability that agent i invests (ai =1 )is denoted by λi = λi(si,H i,H−i,w). At the third decision
node, agents submit bids in the second price sealed-bid auction. At this note, the information sets
are (si,H i,H−i,w,a i,t i). It is well known that in an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies of
a private value Vickrey auction bidders bid their true values. Thus, equilibrium bids are given by
V (si,t i)+bai + εwi.
Clearly, an ε−coupon mechanism has multiple equilibria. Some of these equilibria are highly
implausible. In order to rule out such equilibria we introduce a restriction on strategies in the
spirit of ‘intuitive’ criteria such as D1 of Cho and Kreps (1987) or stability of Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986). A strategy of agent j is monotonic, if two vectors H−j and H0
−j diﬀer only in a
component i so that if Hi >H 0
i, then pj(sj,H j,H−j,w) ≤ pj(sj,H j,H0
−j,w0). In other words, a
monotonic strategy of agent j assumes that for any history, the probability that agent j invests is
15In an all pay sealed bid auction every agent submits a sealed bid. All agents have to pay the amount of their
bids regardless of whether or not they won the object. The agent with the highest bid receives the object. (In case
of a tie the winner is randomly chosen from the set of highest bidders.) Fullerton and McAfee (1999) use an all-pay
auction in their ’contestant selection auction’.
17non-increasing in the size of the payment that some other agent j, i 6= j makes in the signalling
stage.
The requirement that the equilibrium strategies are monotonic rules out the ‘bizarre’ equilib-
rium, where all agents bid zero in the signalling stage and an agent who bids a positive amount is
perceived to be of the lowest type. Basically, there are two reasons why an equilibrium strategy
may not be monotonic: First, perverse beliefs may sustain an equilibrium in strategies that are
not monotonic. An example of such ‘unnatural’ beliefs is as follows: The more an agent bids for a
discount coupon, the lower is her perceived si. Obviously, this is counter-intuitive: the higher is an
agent’s si, the more she values the discount coupon. The second possibility stems from coordination
aspect of the game. If bids in the signalling stage are used as coordination devices for selecting a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the remaining subgame, an equilibrium resulting from these beliefs
may include strategies that are not monotonic.
Theorem 4 In an ε−coupon mechanism, there exists a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equi-
librium in monotonic strategies. The probability that the equilibrium yields an eﬃcient outcome
converges to one as ε → 0.
Before giving a formal proof to the results, let us sketch the intuition why a pooling equilibrium
where everybody bids zero for the coupon is not a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in monotonic
strategies. Indeed, if everybody bids zero, the coupon can be purchased for an arbitrarily small
amount. Thus, the pooling equilibrium is sustainable only if bidders are discouraged from bidding
a positive amount by their beliefs that a positive bid would encourage other bidders to invest
more aggressively in the action stage. However, this belief is inconsistent with strategies being
monotonic. The same argument applies to any partially pooling equilibrium. We show that there
are no equilibria in mixed strategies, because the willingness to pay for the discount is an increasing
function of the bidder’s signal. The eﬃciency result for an ε−coupon equilibrium follows from
Theorem 3 that establishes that for ε =0 , there exists an eﬃcient symmetric equilibrium. To
prove asymptotic eﬃciency of a robust equilibrium, we show that when ε approaches 0, the robust
equilibrium converges to the equilibrium described in Theorem 3.16
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 . The proof of existence follows the pattern of the proof of Theorem
2. Construction of an ex-ante equilibrium in the previous section used existence of an ex-post
equilibrium in a mechanism, where payments that make announcements credible are allowed to
be functions of announcements. Here, we use the same idea. As an intermediate step, consider
a mechanism, where the discount is not auctioned oﬀ using an all-pay auction. Instead, bidders
16Also, if the ε-eﬃcient mechanism yields an ineﬃcient outcome, eﬃciency losses are of magnitude ε.
18announce their types in the reporting stage (much like in the mechanism described in Section 3).
After the announcement, bidders make payments hi(b si,b s−i) to make the announcement credible,
and the bidder with the highest announced si receives the ε−discount.
1. After each agent privately learns si, all agents simultaneously announce their types in the
cheap talk stage. Afterwards, each agent must make a payment of hi(b si,b s−i). The agent with the
highest ﬁrst period announcement b s receives the discount coupon (ties are broken using a lottery).
Agents take action after observing announcements b s.
2. After the third period signals t are revealed, the object is sold via a second-price sealed-bid
auction.
We shall show that there exists a payment schedule hi(b si,b s−i) such that truthful reporting
supported by paying hi(b si,b s−i) is an ex-post equilibrium. The private value of the bidder with
the highest ﬁrst-period signal is essentially boosted by the amount equal to the discount ε. Let
e s(s,b s) be a vector of ‘adjusted’ private value signals, where e si = si + ε if b si > b sj = sj for all
j 6= i, and e si = si otherwise. Assuming b s−i = s−i, we study the ith agent incentives to misreport
t h et r u es i g n a lsi. If all equilibrium reports b si are truthful, then the subgame after ε discount
is assigned is identical to the game considered in Section 3.1. The equilibrium expected pay-oﬀ
of agent i of the subgame, which does not include hi, is denoted by E [e πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)].O n e c a n
express E [e πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)] in terms of E [πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)] (deﬁned in Lemma 1) using ‘adjusted’ private
signals. Let b e s denote a vector of perceived ‘adjusted’ signals of agents; the ith component of b e s is
b e si = b e si(si,b si,b s−i)=e si +( si − b si).T h a ti s ,e s is a vector of ‘adjusted’ private value signals and b e s is
public perception about e s. Now we can write E [e πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)] = E
h
πi(e si,b e si,e s−i)
i
.
To prove that a separating equilibrium exists, we need to formulate an increasing-diﬀerences
condition similar to equation (2). We formally state this claim as follows:
For any N − 1-tuple of truthful reports s−i, and any ˆ s0















e πi(si, ˆ s0
i,s−i)
¤
− E [e πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)]. (4)
To prove the claim, we need to consider three cases: (a) the agent wins the ε discount if she
makes announcement ˆ s0
i but not ˆ si; (b) an agent wins the discount for either announcement ˆ s0
i or
ˆ si; (c) neither ˆ s0
i, nor ˆ si are high enough to win the discount.
For (b) and (c), equation (4) follows immediately from Lemma 1. It remains to show that
it also holds for the case (a). Denote s−i =( sm
−i,s−m
−i ),w h e r esm
−i is the largest component of
the vector s−i and s−m
−i is an N − 2-dimensional vector that consists of all components of vector
s−i other than its largest component sm
−i. Applying the new notation, one gets E [e πi(si, ˆ si,s−i)] =
E
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Using Lemma A3 (from the Appendix) completes the proof of (5).
Since (5) holds, there exists an ex-post separating equilibrium in the “intermediate mechanism”.
Using existence of an ex-post equilibrium, we can apply the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 3 to establish existence of ex-ante separating signalling mechanism, where agents make
signalling payments that are strictly increasing in their signals.
Now we shall prove that any perfect Bayesian equilibrium in monotonic strategies is unique,
fully separating, and ’almost eﬃcient’. In an equilibrium, the probability of any particular bid
with value H in the signalling stage is zero. Indeed, if there is a positive mass of agents that plays
some Hmass with positive probability, then there is a positive probability of a tie. Then an agent
playing Hmass can increase the likelihood of winning the discount ε>0 by increasing her bid by an
inﬁnitesimal amount. Since the strategies are monotonic, none of the agents would increase their
likelihood of taking actions. Thus, such a deviation would be proﬁtable.
Probability that players in the set −i take actions is denoted here as λ−i. Let Π(si,λ−i,s−i)
denote the pay-oﬀ of player i in the subgame after signalling payments H’ sa r es u n k .W ew a n tt o
show that if λ−i ≥ λ0
−i then for every s0







Thus, any decrease in “ﬁnal” private values of player in the set −i is more valuable for player
i with a larger ﬁrst period private signal. Inequality (6) follows from the proof of Lemma 1.
Let us show that all equilibria in monotonic are separating. In such an equilibrium, actions
taken by players depend on their private signals and the announcements of other players; one can
write λ−i = λ−i(s−i,H−i,H i) and λ0
−i = λ−i(s−i,H−i,H0
i). (From above, we can conclude that a
tie is a measure zero event; and so have no impact on expected payoﬀs.) For monotonic strategies
20λ−i ≥ λ0
−i for H0
i >H i (the inequality holds for all components). Inequality (6) implies that
H(s) is weakly increasing in s. Now we can conclude that H(s) is strictly increasing in s almost
everywhere.
Let us show that in an equilibrium, λi(H−i,H i(si),s i) is non decreasing in si. Indeed, λ−i =
λ−i(s−i,H−i,H i) is weakly decreasing in Hi. According to single crossing condition, if an agent
with a ﬁrst period signal si invests with positive probability λi(H−i,H i(si),s i) > 0, then any agent
with a signal s0
i >s i strictly prefers to invest, and λi(H−i,H i(s0
i),s 0
i)=1 . Therefore, there exists
a unique equilibrium in the subgame which is consistent with a monotonic strategy proﬁle. In
this equilibrium, all agents with private values exceeding some critical value s∗(H) invest. From
the previous paragraph and Theorem 1, it follows that ε−coupon mechanism yields an eﬃcient
allocation with probability converging to one as ε converges to zero.
To establish uniqueness of the robust equilibrium, we use a standard argument (e.g., Klemperer,
1999). Condition (6) implies that
dH(s)
ds is the same in any robust equilibrium. Above, we showed
that there is a unique robust equilibrium in the subgame following the all-pay auction. It remains
to show that H(0) = 0. Suppose otherwise, say H(0) = H0 > 0. For a player with si =0 , H(0) = 0
is a proﬁtable deviation: Indeed, after this she does not change the perception of her type (she is
correctly perceived to have si =0 ). It was demonstrated that in a robust equilibrium each player
either invests with probability one or zero (except perhaps for a set of measure zero). Thus, the
deviation can only cause other players to increase the probability with which they invest; however,
given the set of players that invest, none of the players that do not invest in a robust equilibrium
would choose to invest. ¥
Let us now consider an example illustrating that the all pay auction part of the ε−coupon
mechanism is crucial for ensuring that any perfect Bayesian equilibrium in monotonic strategies is
separating and nearly eﬃcient.
Example 5 Suppose the all-pay auction is replaced with a second-price sealed-bid auction. When
as u ﬃciently small discount is auctioned oﬀ via a second price auction, the following ineﬃcient
pooling equilibrium is robust: all agents bid ε for the discount of size ε. Indeed, we need to specify
beliefs that support this equilibrium. If an agent deviates by bidding less than ε, she is perceived
to have the lowest possible signal si. Thus, there are no incentives to bid less than ε, provided that
ε is suﬃciently small. If an agent bids more than ε, the beliefs of other agents about her type
are the same as if she bids ε. Thus, bidding more than ε is a bad strategy: If there are N agents
bidding ε each in a second-price auction, each of them has a 1
N chance of getting the discount. The
winner of the discount “envies” the bidders who did not win the discount, and thus do not have to
pay anything in the signalling stage. By bidding more than ε, an agent insures that she wins the
21discount and will have to pay for it, thus, making herself worse oﬀ. In contrast, there are no robust
pooling equilibrium of the ε−coupon mechanism (by Theorem 4). For instance, if all agents bid ε
for the discount, bidding slightly more than ε is a proﬁtable deviation.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We put forth an eﬃcient mechanism for allocating an object, when complimentary investment is
possible. Also, we propose a mechanism that allows to implement the desired outcome. At least
in theory, the ε−coupon auction proposed herein has several important advantages under this
environment. First, it has a unique robust equilibrium. Second, this equilibrium yields eﬃcient
allocation with near certainty (see Theorem 4). An ε−coupon auction seems simple and intuitive
enough to have viable practical applications. Albeit, no amount of theorizing can guarantee that it
performs well with human decision makers. Thus, comparison of an ε−coupon auction and other
t y p e so fa u c t i o n sm a yb eah i g hp a y - o ﬀ project for an experimental economist.
An ε−coupon auction might be preferable to a Vickrey auction even if it is not certain whether
or not the environment allows for both exogenous shocks and endogenous actions. In the extreme
case where no information revelation takes place in the signalling round, an ε−coupon auction yields
a negligibly small loss in eﬃciency relative to a one-round second-price auction. However, as long
as information revelation occurs in the signalling round of the ε−coupon auction, the additional
information is likely to improve performance of the auction conducted in the second round. With
independent private values, ε−coupon auction is eﬃcient, but, obviously, using a simpler eﬃcient
mechanism is more practical in this case. However, it is reassuring that using an ε−coupon auction
does no harm even if the environment has no features we explore. In short, ε−coupon auction seem
to oﬀer substantial beneﬁts with a minimum downside.
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24Appendix
For any number (function) x, let x+ =m a x {x,0}. A random variable X (ﬁrst-order) stochastically
dominates a random variable Y (denoted X º Y ) if and only if for cumulative density functions,
one has FX(z) ≤ FY (z) for any z ∈ R. An equivalent condition is that E [h(X)] ≥ E [h(Y )] for any
increasing function h (e.g., Krishna, 2002, Appendix B).
Lemma A. (1) Suppose that X,Z and Y,W are random variables, and in both pairs variables are
independent of each other. Suppose that X º Y, W º Z. Then X − Z º Y − W.
(2) For any random variables X and Y such that X º Y , and a random variable Z, which is
independent of X,Y, max{X,Z}ºmax{Y,Z}.
(3) For any random variables X and Y such that X stochastically dominates Y ,a n da n y
constant z ≥ 0,
E [X + z]
+ − E [X]
+ ≥ E [Y + z]
+ − E [Y ]
+ .
(4) For any independent random variables X,Y,Z such that X º Y, and any constant t ≥
0,E[max{X + t,Y,Z}] º E [max{X,Y + t,Z}].
(5) Let q(x,y) be a continuous function increasing in both arguments, and let X,Y be two
random variables. For any realizations x1 >x 2 of the random variable X, the distribution of Y
conditional on x1 (ﬁrst-order) stochastically dominates the distribution of Y conditional on x2.
Then q(x1,Y) º q(x2,Y).
Proof. (1)-(3) are straightforward calculations.
(4) For any numbers x,y, and z, max{x,y} =( x−y)++y. We start with the following identites
max{X + t,Y,Z} =( X + t − max{Y,Z})+ +m a x {Y,Z},
max{X,Y,Z} =( X − max{Y,Z})+ +m a x {Y,Z}.
Then
max{X + t,Y,Z} − max{X,Y,Z} =( X + t − max{Y,Z})+ − (X − max{Y,Z})+,
max{X,Y + t,Z} − max{X,Y,Z} =( Y + t − max{X,Z})+ − (Y − max{X,Z})+.
From (2), we know that max{X,Z}ºmax{Y,Z}. (1) implies that X − max{Y,Z}ºY −
max{X,Z}. Using (3) completes the proof.
(5) Deﬁne τ(x,z) to satisfy q(x,τ(x,z)) = z.Clearly, τ(x,z) is increasing in z.Now Fq(x1,Y )(z)=
FY |x1(τ(x1,z)) ≤ FY |x1(τ(x2,z)) and Fq(x2,Y )(z)=FY |x2(τ(x2,z)) ≥ FY |x1(τ(x2,z)), the latter
inequality following from the fact that Y |x1 º Y |x2. Therefore, for any z, Fq(x1,Y )(z) ≤ Fq(x2,Y )(z).
¥
25Proof of Theorem 1. (1) Let a(m)=a(m,s) denote the vector of actions, where the agents
with the highest m ﬁrst-period signals invest, while the other N − m agents skip the possibility.






i,a i = a0
i for all i 6= j,k,a n dl e taj =1 , ak =0 ,a 0
j =0 , and a0
k =1 .
If sj ≥ sk, then the expected social surplus from a is greater than that from a0. Indeed, Let e a
be a vector of actions with e aj = e ak =0and e ai = ai = a0
i for all i 6= j,k. Lemma A (4) yields
that V (sj,T j) º V (sk,T k) whenever sj ≥ sk. Now one can use Lemma A (3) with the constant
be aj = be ak, and the claim is proved.
The shows that a vector of actions maximizing the expected social surplus must be of the form
a(m) for some m, 0 ≤ m ≤ N. Since there is a ﬁnite number of possible m’s, there exists some r∗
such that a(r∗) is the global maximizer of the expected social surplus. This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
(2) Deﬁnition of Gi(s,a−i) implies that an action vector maximizing the social surplus must satisfy
Gi(s,a−i) ≥ 0 when ai =1and Gi(s,a−i) ≤ 0 when ai =0 . We introduce a function gi(s,a−i)
deﬁned as the change in the expected utility of the agent i as a result of taking an action instead
of skipping it, and prove the following claim:
gi(s,a−i)=Gi(s,a−i).
Let Z =m a x j6=i {V (sj,t j)+baj}), and X = V (si,t i). By deﬁnition,
gi(s,a−i)=E [X + b − Z]
+ − E [X − Z]
+ .
Using the formula max{x,y} =( x − y)+ + y,w eg e t
Gi(s,a−i)=E [max{X + b,Z}] − E [max{X,Z}]
= E [X + b − Z]
+ + E [Z] − (E [X − Z]
+ + E [Z])
= E [X + b − Z]
+ − E [X − Z]
+ = gi(s,a−i),
as claimed.
Now observe that if a is a solution to the social planner’s problem, then Gi(s,a−i) ≥ 0 when
ai =1and Gi(s,a−i) ≤ 0 when ai =0 . Indeed, if Gi(s,a−i) < 0 when ai =1 , the agent’s i switch
from acting to non-acting would strictly increases the expected social surplus, contradicting the
choice of a. Similarly, Gi(s,a−i) ≤ 0 when ai =0 . T h e nt h ec l a i mp r o v e da b o v ea s s e r t st h a tw eh a v e
gi(s,a−i) ≥ 0 for agents that invest, and gi(s,a−i) ≤ 0 for others. Thus, no agent has incentives to
deviate, and (ii) of Theorem 1 is proved.¥
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